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Judge’s criticism of punitive damages laws did not warrant disqualification

February/March 2021

A Florida appellate court held that a judge’s criticism of punitive damages laws did not amount to judicial bias warranting disqualification.
Here, a plaintiff in a tort action against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. sought to disqualify the judge from continuing to preside over her case. The plaintiff argued that disqualification was warranted because the judge had expressed criticism about certain punitive damages laws applicable to the resolution of the dispute.

Denying the petition, the appellate court concluded that the judge’s comments could not form a reasonable basis for the plaintiff to fear she would not receive a fair trial. Citing case law, the court said that judges are often required to uphold and enforce laws with which they do not agree. Although it may be ill-advised to express such a disagreement, the court said, the fact that a statute or legal principle runs counter to a judge’s personal views does not necessarily warrant the judge’s disqualification from trying a case. Here, the judge’s comments constitute a statement of philosophy, not a stated judicial policy, the court said, noting that after making the comments, the court acknowledged that it was bound by the standards set forth in applicable appellate decisions. Thus, the plaintiff had failed to allege judicial bias.

Citation: Ledo v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2020 WL 6154234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2020).

Comment: In Frogel v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2020 WL 6301729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2020), an Engle progeny case, 189 potential jurors were available at trial in a courtroom that had a maximum capacity of 100. The trial court granted the defendant’s request to dismiss eight prospective jurors based entirely on written answers in their voir dire questionnaires. The court agreed with the defense that based on their written responses, the prospective jurors were biased and could not be rehabilitated. The jury later awarded $50,000, attributing 80% fault to the plaintiff’s decedent. Under a joint pre-trial stipulation capping any comparative fault finding, the trial court entered judgment for $25,000. The plaintiff appealed, arguing, in part, that the trial court had erred in releasing the jurors without allowing the plaintiff to question them. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that based on the written answers in the questionnaires and without the benefit of oral examination, it was not conclusively clear here that any or all of the eight dismissed jurors could not be impartial. Citing case law, the court added that a reasonable examination of jurors is a right that must be preserved for litigants. AAJ member David J. Sales and Daniel R. Hoffman, both of Sarasota, Fla.; Randy Rosenblum, Miami; and AAJ members Gary M. Paige and Robert E. Gordon, both of Palm Beach Gardens, Fla.

See also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Coates, 2020 WL 6219570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2020). There, the estate of former longtime smoker Lois Stucky sued R.J. Reynolds, alleging wrongful death. The plaintiff succeeded on her claim that the defendant had defectively designed its Winston and Doral cigarette brands and was awarded $300,000 in compensatory damages, reduced by 50% for Stucky’s comparative fault. The jury also awarded $16 million in punitive damages. Unsuccessful in its posttrial motions, the defendant appealed, arguing that the punitive damages award was excessive. The appellate court reversed and remanded for remittitur, finding that the punitive damages award was excessive. The court noted the enormous disparity between the jury’s punitive and compensatory awards and found that a punitive damages award that is more than 53 times a compensatory award was unsustainable under state law and excessive under federal due process considerations. Citing case law, the court said that it is not the actual dollar amount of the punitive damages award that was excessive here, but the amount of the punitive damages award as compared to the compensatory damages award.