Products Liability Law Reporter

A Florida appellate court held that a trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by compelling the deposition of Tesla, Inc., CEO Elon Musk in a case arising out of a high-speed collision.

Teenager Barrett Riley was driving his Tesla Model S at 116 mph when he crashed, killing himself and passenger Edgar Monserratt Martinez. A Tesla service technician had previously deactivated the car’s 85-mph speed-limiting software at Riley’s request. Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk, called Riley’s father to extend his condolences. During the phone call, which lasted approximately 20 minutes, Musk allegedly told Riley’s father that perhaps Tesla should not have removed the speed-limiting software and that the company would have to review and revise its policies. The two also allegedly exchanged multiple emails regarding the information learned in the crash investigation.

Martinez’s father, as personal representative of his son’s estate, sued Tesla, Inc., for negligence stemming from the software deactivation. The plaintiff sought to take Musk’s deposition regarding the phone call. In response, Tesla claimed that Musk was entitled to protection under Florida civil procedure rules. Tesla also filed Musk’s declaration, in which he stated that a deposition would place a substantial hardship on him. Additionally, Musk stated he had no independent recollection of the phone call beyond what was in the emails, which Tesla produced for the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a protective order and concluded that the call was one of condolence and that Musk did not possess unique, personal knowledge.

The case was transferred to a different judge, and the plaintiff again sought to depose Musk regarding the phone call. The trial court granted the motion, finding there was a dispute regarding what Musk had said to Riley’s father. The defense sought certiorari review of the order compelling Musk’s deposition.

Granting the petition and quashing the order, the appellate court noted that a party seeking certiorari review of a non-final order must demonstrate (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal. Under the corporate apex doctrine, the court added, a current or former high-level corporate officer may seek an order preventing the officer from being subject to a deposition. Such a motion must be accompanied by an affidavit or declaration of the officer explaining that the officer lacks unique, personal knowledge of the issues being litigated, the court said. Once Tesla established that Musk was a high-level officer and produced a declaration, the court added, the trial court was required to issue a protective order unless the plaintiff demonstrated that he had exhausted other discovery; that this was inadequate; and that Musk had unique, personal knowledge of discoverable information.

The court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that the existing discovery was inadequate or that Musk had unique, personal knowledge of discoverable information. Musk had already provided sworn testimony attesting that he did not recall making any statements during the phone call regarding the speed limiter, the court found, concluding that a deposition would serve only to harass and burden Tesla and disrupt Musk’s ability to meet his obligations as Tesla CEO.

Consequently, the court held that the trial court had departed from the essential requirements of the law by compelling Musk’s deposition.

Citation: Tesla, Inc. v. Monserratt, 2024 WL 24813 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2024).