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Utah High Court Confirms that Elements of Legal Malpractice Claims Arising Out of Civil and Criminal Matters Are Identical

November/December 2019

Paxman v. King, 2019 WL 3384928 (Utah July 26, 2019).

The Utah Supreme Court confirmed its recent holding that the elements of a legal malpractice claim based on an underlying criminal case are the same as what is required to prove civil malpractice claims.

Here, attorney Brian King represented optometrist Paul Paxman in a criminal case arising out of Paxman’s Medicaid billing practices. Paxman, following King’s advice, pleaded guilty to several charges and was placed on a federal exclusion list that prevented him from participating in certain federal health care programs, among other things. Paxman later sued King for malpractice, asserting that he failed to adequately advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty or the likelihood of success at trial. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff’s claims were barred under either the exoneration rule or the actual innocence rule. The trial court denied the motion, declining to adopt either rule.

Affirming, the court cited Thomas v. Hillyard, 445 P.3d 521 (Utah 2019), in which it held that the elements of a legal malpractice claim based on an underlying criminal matter are identical to the legal elements needed to prove a malpractice claim based on a civil issue. The court confirmed its decision in Thomas and rejected the defendant’s additional arguments that adoption of the exoneration or actual innocence rules will promote judicial economy and prevent inconsistent judgments. The court found that requiring innocence or exoneration can both conserve and waste judicial resources, depending on the result of the postconviction relief proceeding and whether collateral estoppel bars a subsequent malpractice action. Moreover, the court reasoned, a finding of malpractice liability is a determination not of a client’s guilt or innocence but merely whether there was a breach of the professional standard of care. 

Thus, the trial court’s ruling was proper.