Trial News

In an issue of first impression, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that its courts have personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if they are served while intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in the state. The court determined that statutorily derived personal jurisdiction and questions of due process did not override the common law rule of transient jurisdiction that exists in the state, and it explained that judges have discretion to determine whether transient jurisdiction is appropriate on a case-by-case basis. (Roch v. Mollica, 2019 WL 97904 (Mass. Jan. 4, 2019).)

Caroline Roch, a New Jersey resident, played softball for the Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts and was injured during a pool party at a rental house in Florida that she attended for a team event. Roch sued the parents of the softball team’s head coach, alleging that they were negligent in allowing the “dangerous act of hazing or initiation,” which led to the plaintiff being pushed into the pool and sustaining a shoulder injury, and for failing to seek immediate medical attention for the plaintiff. The defendants, who are New Hampshire residents, were served in-hand process in Massachusetts while attending one of the school’s softball games.

The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts, and the trial court granted the motion on the grounds that service of process was separate from personal jurisdiction and that it alone did not allow the court to exercise jurisdiction because the defendants had no connection with the state. The plaintiff appealed, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed to review the issue as one of first impression.

Overturning the lower court, the state high court focused on the common law rule of transient jurisdiction, which allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when they are present in the state and served with process. Previous state case law established that to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, there must be a statute that authorizes jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be in line with the U.S. Constitution’s due process clause. In this case, the only statutorily authorized personal jurisdiction would arise from the state’s long-arm statute, but that would require the claims to arise from “acts or omissions related to Massachusetts.” However, the plaintiff had acknowledged that the long-arm statute did not apply because the alleged negligence occurred in Florida.

The state supreme court articulated its test for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents:  Jurisdiction can be exercised if the party is served with process “while intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily in Massachusetts.” Finding that personal jurisdiction statutes do not replace common law transient jurisdiction, the court then turned to U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Burnham v. Superior Court of California (495 U.S. 604 (1990)), which noted that transient jurisdiction is prevalent throughout the country and upheld an exercise of transient jurisdiction—albeit in a plurality rather than majority decision.

The court further noted that it preferred to adhere to precedent and that judges still retain discretion not to exercise transient jurisdiction when forum non conveniens is an issue. It rejected the argument that transient jurisdiction is “outdated” and that jurisdictional questions should be considered through a lens of what is fair. The court explained that transient jurisdiction is no different from a fairness standpoint than a long-arm statute. People who avail themselves of a state’s “benefits”—by being present in the state and using its roads, public amenities, and more—should have a reasonable expectation that it is not inherently unfair for the state to then exercise jurisdiction over them as a party in litigation. Finally, the exercise of transient jurisdiction comported with due process under Burnham.

Boston attorney Traver Clinton Smith, who represented the plaintiff, said that the decision “clarified an important point of law.” He explained that Burnham applies to the same combination of circumstances as in Roch’s case: “That is the same clear principle that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wanted to clarify in the common law by means of the unanimous decision in the Roch case. At the same time, the Roch court made clear that a defendant’s right to a potential claim of forum non conveniens is not necessarily abrogated by the Roch decision and may yet be available to some defendants in some cases, even if not here.” Smith cautioned, however, that circumstances such as those in Roch are “rare” and that “the decision does not apply to corporate, institutional, or business defendants.”

“As one of the justices commented during oral argument, while the Burnham decision was based on different rationales expressed by different justices, the various opinions all ended up at the same vanishing point on the horizon, unanimously upholding the common law rule of transient jurisdiction. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court used the Roch case as an opportunity to make Massachusetts law with respect to transient jurisdiction 100 percent congruent with the law set forth in Burnham.”