Trial News

The Oregon Supreme Court has ruled that a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 accrues when the plaintiff “knows or reasonably should know” of both the injury and “the defendant’s role in causing the injury.” Although the plaintiff filed a §1983 claim 16 years after suffering sexual abuse at a state facility, the court found that this satisfied the state’s two-year statute of limitations because he filed within two years of learning about a defendant’s alleged role in enabling the abuse. The court reviewed §1983 jurisprudence from across the country before reaching its ruling, which supports access to the courts. (J. M. v. Oregon Youth Auth., 2019 WL 244466 (Or. Jan. 17, 2019)).

In 1998, J.M., then 15, was sent to an Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) facility where Gary Lawhead was superintendent. While housed at the facility, J.M. was repeatedly sexually abused by Frank Milligan, one of the facility’s adult employees. J.M., who was released to his family in 1999, did not report the abuse to anyone at the facility.

In 2012, after repressing thoughts of the abuse, J.M.’s memories returned after the media’s extensive coverage of the Penn State University sexual abuse scandal. J.M. told his wife of the abuse for the first time and began searching the internet for information about Milligan. J.M. discovered that Milligan was serving a 36-year prison sentence for sexually abusing two boys—one in 1997 who was a patient at the Oregon State Hospital where Milligan worked before being hired at the OYA facility.

J.M. reported to police that Milligan had abused him, and in 2014, J.M. sued OYA for sexual battery of a child and Lawhead for §1983 violations, alleging that Lawhead had failed to “address the known threat of sexual abuse posed by Milligan” in violation of J.M.’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. In 2015, an Oregon jury found Milligan guilty of abusing J.M., and Milligan was sentenced to an additional 35 years in prison.

In 2016, the civil trial court granted Lawhead’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that J.M.’s claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run in 1998 when the abuse occurred. The appellate court reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.

Because federal law governs the accrual of §1983 claims, the state high court began by analyzing two U.S. Supreme Court cases: Manuel v. City of Joliet (137 S. Ct. 911 (2017)) and Wallace v. Kato (549 U.S. 384 (2007)). The court rejected the defense argument that under Wallace, accrual occurs at the time of the injury. Instead, the court found that these Supreme Court decisions indicate that this analysis should be “flexible” and “functional” with accrual depending on “when the plaintiff has sufficient information for it to be feasible to file a complaint and seek remedies from those responsible.”

The court then examined its precedent in T.R. v. Boy Scouts of America (181 P.3d 758 (Or. 2008)) in which it held that the “discovery accrual rule” for §1983 claims established that the “statute of limitations does not begin to run until a reasonably prudent plaintiff perceives both the injury and the role that the defendant has played in that injury.” Rejecting the defendant’s position that T.R. conflicted with Wallace, the court found that T.R. mirrored the Supreme Court’s analysis and remained binding.

To further support this conclusion, the court reviewed relevant federal appellate case law, noting that “all the federal circuit courts to have addressed the accrual of section 1983 claims post-Wallace have used some form of the discovery rule.” Although some case law supports the defendant’s position, the court found that the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits follow an accrual rule like that in T.R., with the First and Sixth Circuits appearing to “require discovery of more than the injury alone.” The court went through these cases in detail and concluded that “no federal circuit court has derived from Wallace the strict occurrence-based rule that defendant proposes.” An accrual rule that considers when a plaintiff learned of the defendant’s role in causing an injury comports with the “practical realities for plaintiffs who are seeking to vindicate constitutional rights,” the court wrote, affirming that J.M.’s §1983 claim was not time-barred.

“This decision allows plaintiffs the scope of time needed to discover the potential tortfeasors who caused their injuries,” said Portland, Ore., attorney Dennis Steinman, who represents the plaintiff. “By rejecting the extraordinarily narrow standard the defense was trying to impose, the Oregon Supreme Court vindicated plaintiffs’ rights to access the courts. The opinion gives a careful analysis on relevant case law throughout the country, breaking it down circuit by circuit. For an attorney handling a §1983 claim, this case is a valuable road map for handling this issue and how to proceed.”